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Summary. In this paper, criticizing the welfarist’s framework in traditional welfare
economics which provides a rather limited perspective for social evaluation, we pro-
pose a more comprehensive framework in which extended social ordering functions
(ESOFs) are introduced. In this framework, not only welfaristic values, but also
non-welfaristic values can be treated appropriately. Then, we examine the possibil-
ity of non-welfarist ESOFs which meet a value of Individual Autonomy, a criterion
of non-welfairst distributive justice, and the welfarist Pareto principle. First, there
is no ﬁrst best ESOF in the sense that the above three axioms are satisﬁed simul-
taneously. Second, however, we can show the existence of some second best ESOFs,
using a weaker lexicographic application method.
JEL Classiﬁcation Numbers: D63, I31, I38.
1I n t r o d u c t i o n
Welfarism is deﬁned as a methodology that evaluates social welfare accord-
ing to the level of satisfaction with regard to individuals’ subjective prefer-
ences. For this methodology, the criticisms by Amartya Sen [Sen (1979; 1980)],
Ronald Dworkin [Dworkin (1981a; 2000)], and others are well known. These
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criticized the limited scope of information used to evaluate social welfare in
the aforementioned methodology. Moreover, they criticize the welfarist neu-
tral attitude vis-` a-vis the problem of what types of preferences are satisﬁed.
There are types of preferences, such as the utility of individual oﬀensive tastes,
that of expensive tastes, that of formation of the adaptive preference, or that
of cheaper tastes such as in the case of the ‘termed housewife,’ all of which
should be carefully and distinctively treated in the evaluation of social welfare
from an ethical point of view. The point of these critiques is that the welfarist
evaluation has no concern for such preferential diﬀerences.
The problems with welfarist methodology can emerge in a more acute form
within the arguments of welfare economics such as the hypothetical compen-
sation principle. For instance, let us take the Kaldor principle, which declares
an alternative x to be superior to an alternative y if and only if there is an-
other alternative z which is reached through redistribution from x such that
z is better than y according to the Pareto principle. This principle is welfarist
in nature, since it evaluates policies based only on satisfaction of individuals’
preferences of goods and services, and it is also an extension of the Pareto
principle as is clear from its deﬁnition. It makes clear judgments on policy
changes, based on whether or not there is a possibility of potential Pareto
improvement of said changes. It is also well-known that the validity of execut-
ing a policy according to the hypothetical compensation principle is possibly
conﬁrmed by means of such monetary measures as the gross national income
test, whenever the change in resource allocation caused by the policy is not
radical.
According to the above argument, the notion of social welfare that the hy-
pothetical compensation principle considers as its premise is no less than the
sum of subjective satisfaction levels obtained from the consumption of ‘mar-
ketable’ goods and services, which can be evaluated by monetary measures.
However, the notion of social welfare in general is broad enough to encompass
a wide range of ethical viewpoints. The social welfare that welfarist’s welfare
economics refers to is not as broad, but it is limited to (market) economic
welfare.
Against such an argument, the following objection may arise from the
welfarist position:
It is true that the social welfare analysis utilized in conventional applied eco-
nomics concerns only the social welfare as the total sum of satisfaction of
individuals’ preferences over goods and services, which is convertible to mon-
etary value. However, the concept of social welfare can be extended so as to
consider the ‘utility’ from an outcome other than the private consumption of
goods and services, extending the domain of the individual utility function if
necessary.
Such an approach is one way to expand the limited informational basis of con-
ventional welfarist’s welfare economics. However, even using this approach, we
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because it treats and evaluates everything, including the private consumption
of goods and services as well as intrinsic goods such as friendship, through the
prism of the same subjective utility functions. The concept of social welfare
in this approach is still corresponding solely to the satisfaction of individual
subjective preferences. In contrast, this paper argues that the social welfare
should be evaluated, not only from the perspective of subjective preferences
or tastes, but also from the perspective of welfare and well-being that can-
not be grasped by utilizing such preferences. For instance, the viewpoint of
“respect for liberal rights” presented in Sen’s Liberal Paradox [Sen (1970a,b)]
and his theory of “functioning and capability” [Sen (1985)] oﬀer such concepts
of welfare and well-being.
The criticism of welfarism mentioned above becomes relevant not only in
the discussion of the criteria of policy evaluation based on the hypothetical
compensation principle, but also in the general discussion of welfarist social
welfare functions. A social welfare function associates an ordering over social
alternatives with each social choice environment. According to the ordering
derived from such a function, the society can identify what the most desired
policies are, which would realize the most desired social alternatives.
The basic problem in this context is what type of social welfare function
should be constructed, and it is in the course of such discussions that the
conventional Bergson-Samuelson (B-S) social welfare functions are perceived
as problematic. The very reason for this is that in the B-S social welfare func-
tions, the level of individual satisfaction with their subjective preferences is
the sole basis of information. However, the orderings over social alternatives
given by social welfare functions should reﬂect an adequate indicator of indi-
viduals’ well-being. The criticism of welfarism mentioned so far indicates that
individual satisfaction with their subjective preferences is no more than one
aspect of welfare and therefore a more pluralistic viewpoint is necessary.
To treat such a pluralistic viewpoint appropriately, a more comprehensive
framework is necessary. As such, we propose the extended framework within
which not only welfarist notions of individual well-being, but also non-welfarist
notions of consequential values, as well as non-consequential values, can be
taken into consideration. The extended framework in this paper takes a pair
of feasible allocation and allocation rule as an informational basis for the
social evaluation of economic policies, and it also proposes to make use of
extended social ordering functions, each of which associates a social ordering
over the set of pairs of feasible allocations and allocation rules with each
e c o n o m i ce n v i r o n m e n t .W i t h i ns u c ha ne x t e n d e df r a m e w o r k ,w ep r o p o s et h r e e
basic criteria, each of which respectively represents: 1) a value of individual
autonomy, 2) a value of non-welfaristic consequentialism, and 3) a value of
welfarist consequentialism. Moreover, we examine the possibility of extended
social ordering functions which satisfy these three pluralistic values.
There has been recently some literature such as Kaplow and Shavell (2001)
and Blackorby, Bossert, and Donaldson (2005) which also discuss some sorts
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their frameworks of social ordering functions, not only the proﬁle of utility
information, but also the proﬁle of non-welfaristic information are taken into
account. Then, both papers show that even in such frameworks with non-
welfaristic information, the feasible class of social ordering functions is reduced
to that of the welfarist types only, whenever the Pareto principle is required.
Despite the conclusions of Kaplow and Shavell (2001) and Blackorby et al.
(2005), we show in this paper that it is possible to construct a desirable social
ordering function that has the properties of the welfarist Pareto principle and
the non-welfarist criteria. There is no contradiction between the results of
these papers and ours, as discussed in Section 5 of this paper.
Section 2 introduces the basic framework and the basic three axioms. Sec-
tion 3 discusses a fundamental incompatibility of these three axioms, and
section 4 explores the possibility of second best extended social ordering func-
tions. Section 5 gives some remarks on the related literature such as Kaplow
and Shavell (2001) and Blackorby et al. (2005).
2 Beyond the welfarist limitation
The need for the pluralistic approach was argued by John Rawls [Rawls
(1971)], Amartya Sen [Sen (1980); 1985]], and Philippe Van Parijs [Van Par-
ijs (1992; 1993; 1995)]. Based on the normative theories of these three non-
welfarists, we propose three basic criteria.
The ﬁrst criterion is that individual autonomy in contemporary society
should be guaranteed. It is a liberal value that contemporary civil societies
respect as an important aspect for evaluating individual well-being. In fact, as
opposed to the feudal society and the centralized socialist society where indi-
vidual autonomy is suppressed, the modern civil society might be character-
ized as having a certain level of political liberalism in legal systems, a certain
level of freedom of choice both in political and economic decision-makings, and
a certain level of decentralized decision-making mechanisms such as markets,
all of which constitute a necessary condition for the guarantee of individual
autonomy. Such a viewpoint would suggest a certain constraint over the class
of ‘desired’ social ordering functions. That is to say, if the social economic
system cannot guarantee the decentralization and the freedom of choice in
decision-making, the welfare that individuals receive under such social situ-
ations will not be highly valued by ‘desired’ social ordering functions, even
if the system may support a suﬃcient level of individual consumption. Thus,
this criterion represents a non-consequential value in nature.
The second criterion is that each and every individual should have as much
opportunity to do whatever he might want to do as is feasibly possible. This
criterion represents a non-welfaristic consequential value in the sense of the
following two points: First, although this criterion pertains to social outcomes
in terms of individual well-being, it hinges on an objective notion of individual
well-being as opposed to welfarist criteria. Second, this criterion does notOn Non-welfarist Social Ordering Functions 5
concern the realization of individual well-being itself, but rather it pertains to
the opportunity to pursue or realize individual well-being. Given these points,
theories of distributive justice are relevant in the discussion of what concept
of individual well-being is appropriate, and of what types of equity notions
should be applied to the assignment problem of individual opportunity sets.
The third criterion represents a well-known welfarist consequential value
such as the Pareto principle. It is worth noting that the standpoint of non-
welfarism does not exclude welfarist notions of well-being. I believe that sat-
isfaction of individual subjective preferences is still an important component
of the informational basis used to constitute an overall notion of individual
well-being. Thus, the Pareto principle is also taken into consideration as a
condition imposed on ‘desired’ social ordering functions.
With this discussion in mind, the question that arises here is whether it is
possible to construct a social ordering function consistent with the diﬀerent
pluralistic criteria mentioned above.
2.1 A Framework of Extended Social Ordering Functions
On the basis of the problems propounded in the previous section, in the follow-
ing subsection, the notion of extended social ordering function is introduced,
which is based on the proposal of Gotoh, Suzumura, and Yoshihara (2005).
There are two goods, one of which is an input (labor time) x ∈ R+ to be used
to produce the other good y ∈ R+.1 There is a set N = {1,...,n} of agents,
where 2 ≤ n<+∞. Each agent i0s consumption is denoted by zi =( xi,y i),
where xi denotes his labor time, and yi the amount of his output. All agents
face a common upper bound of labor time ¯ x,w h e r e0< ¯ x<+∞,a n ds oh a v e
the same consumption set Z ≡ [0, ¯ x] × R+.
Each agent i0s preference is deﬁned on Z and represented by a utility
function ui : Z → R, which is continuous and quasi-concave on Z,s t r i c t l y
monotonic (decreasing in labor time and increasing in the share of output) on
◦
Z≡ [0, ¯ x)×R++,2 and ui (x,0) = 0 for any x ∈ [0, ¯ x]. We use U to denote the
class of such utility functions.
Each agent i has a labor skill, si ∈ R+. The universal set of skills for all
agents is denoted by S = R+. The skill si ∈ S is i0s eﬀective labor supply per
hour measured in eﬃciency units. It can also be interpreted as i0s labor inten-
sity exercised in production. Thus, if the agent’s labor time is xi ∈ [0, ¯ x]a n d
his skill is si ∈ S,t h e nsixi ∈ R+ denotes the agent’s eﬀective labor contri-
bution to production measured in eﬃciency units. The production technology
is a function f : R+ → R+, that is continuous, strictly increasing, concave,
and f (0) = 0. For simplicity, we ﬁx f. Thus, an economy is a pair of proﬁles
e ≡ (u,s)w i t hu =( ui)i∈N ∈ Un and s =( si)i∈N ∈ Sn. Denote the class of
such economies by E ≡ Un ×S n.
1 The symbol R+ denotes the set of non-negative real numbers.
2 The symbol R++ denotes the set of positive real numbers.6 Naoki Yoshihara
Given s =( si)i∈N ∈ Sn, an allocation z =( xi,y i)i∈N ∈ Zn is feasible for
s if
P
yi ≤ f (
P
sixi). We denote by Z (s) the set of feasible allocations for
s ∈ Sn. An allocation z =( zi)i∈N ∈ Zn is Pareto eﬃcient for e =( u,s) ∈ E
if z ∈ Z (s) and there does not exist z0 =( z0
i)i∈N ∈ Z (s) such that for all
i ∈ N, ui (z0
i) ≥ ui (zi), and for some i ∈ N, ui (z0
i) >u i (zi). We use P (e)t o
denote the set of Pareto eﬃcient allocations for e ∈ E.
To complete the description of how our economy functions, what remains
is to specify an allocation rule which assigns, to each i ∈ N, how many hours
he/she works, and how much share of output he/she receives in return. In this
paper, an allocation rule is a game form which is a pair γ =( M,g), where
M = M1 ×···×Mn is the set of admissible proﬁles of individual strategies,
and g is the outcome function which maps each strategy proﬁle m ∈ M into
a unique outcome g (m) ∈ Zn.F o re a c hm ∈ M, g (m)=( gi (m))i∈N,w h e r e
gi (m)=( gi1 (m),g i2 (m)) and gi1 (m) ∈ [0,x]a n dgi2 (m) ∈ R+ for each
i ∈ N.3 Let Γ be the set of all possible such allocation rules. Given γ =
(M,g) ∈ Γ and e ∈ E,anon-cooperative game (γ,e) ∈ Γ ×E is obtained.
Throughout this paper, we will focus on the Nash equilibrium concept
in our analysis of the performance of game forms as allocation rules. Given
γ =( M,g), let m−i =( m1,...,m i−1,m i+1,...,m n) ∈ M−i ≡ ×j∈N\{i}Mj
for each m ∈ M and i ∈ N.G i v e na nm−i ∈ M−i and an m0
i ∈ Mi,( m0
i;m−i)
is an admissible strategy proﬁle obtained from m by replacing mi with m0
i.
Given a game (γ,e) ∈ Γ ×E, m∗ ∈ M is a (pure strategy) Nash equilibrium
if ui(gi(m∗)) ≥ ui(gi(mi,m∗
−i)) for each i ∈ N and each mi ∈ Mi.T h es e to f
all Nash equilibria of (γ,e) is denoted by NE(γ,e). A feasible allocation z∗ ∈
Z (s)i sa(pure strategy) Nash equilibrium allocation of (γ,e)i fz∗ = g(m∗)
for some m∗ ∈ NE(γ,u). The set of all Nash equilibrium allocations of (γ,e)
is denoted by τ(γ,e).
The domain of social preference relations in this paper is given by pairs of
allocations and allocation rules as game forms, which we call extended social
alternatives. The intended interpretation of an extended social alternative,
viz., a pair (z,γ) ∈ Zn × Γ, is that an allocation z is attained through an
allocation rule γ.4 Moreover, given e ∈ E, an extended social alternative
(z,γ) ∈ Zn × Γ is realizable if z ∈ Z (s) ∩ τ(γ,e). Let R(e)d e n o t et h es e to f
realizable extended social alternatives under e ∈ E.
What we call an extended social ordering function (ESOF)i sam a p p i n g
Q : E ³ (Zn × Γ)2 such that Q(e)i sa no r d e r i n go nR(e) for every e ∈ E.5
The intended interpretation of Q(e)i st h a t ,f o ra n y( z1,γ1), (z2,γ2) ∈ R(e),
((z1,γ1),(z2,γ2)) ∈ Q(e) holds if and only if realizing a feasible allocation
3 Note that gi1 (mi,m−i)=xi is describing the work-hour supply of an individ-
ual i ∈ N that the outcome function designates corresponding to the strategy
(mi,m−i) ∈ M.
4 The concept of an extended social alternative was introduced by Pattanaik and
Suzumura (1996), capitalizing on the suggestion by Arrow (1951, pp.89-91).
5 A binary relation R on a universal set X is a quasi-ordering if it satisﬁes reﬂexivity
and transitivity.A nordering i saq u a s i - o r d e r i n gs a t i s f y i n gcompleteness as well.On Non-welfarist Social Ordering Functions 7
z1 through an allocation rule γ1 is at least as good as realizing a feasible
allocation z2 t h r o u g ha na l l o c a t i o nr u l eγ2 according to the social judgments
embodied in Q(e) .T h ea s y m m e t r i cp a r ta n dt h es y m m e t r i cp a r to fQ(e) will
be denoted by P(Q(e)) and I(Q(e)), respectively. The set of all ESOFs will
be denoted by Q.
The notion of extended social ordering functions enables us to treat the cri-
teria of individual autonomy, equitable assignment of opportunities in terms of
objective well-being, and the Pareto principle in a uniﬁed framework. Within
the domain Zn × Γ of social preference orderings derived from ESOFs, the
component of game forms constitutes necessary data for formulating orderings
based on the criterion of individual autonomy, whereas the data of feasible
allocations is relevant to the remaining two criteria.
In the following part, the above mentioned three criteria are formalized as
axioms applicable to ESOFs.
(I) Individual Autonomy in terms of Choice of Labor Hours
According to the theory of individual liberty that John Stuart Mill pro-
posed [Mill (1859)], there ought to exist in human life a certain minimal sphere
of personal liberty that should not be interfered with by anybody other than
the person in question. Such a sphere should be socially respected and pro-
tected as part of individual rights in a liberal society. The question where
exactly to draw the boundary between the sphere of personal liberty and that
of social authority is a matter of great dispute, and, indeed, how large of a
sphere each individual should be entitled to is a controversial issue. Neverthe-
less, the notion of the inviolability of a minimal sphere of individual liberal
rights seems to be deeply ingrained in our social and political fabric.
Thus, a resource allocation policy would rarely be accepted, if its goal
or its implementation were incompatible with this minimal guarantee of in-
dividual liberty. Such a viewpoint is relevant to our ﬁrst axiom of extended
social ordering functions. We will discuss what constitutes the minimal guar-
antee of individual rights in the context of resource allocations that this paper
considers.
In cases of resource allocation problems, the components of political free-
dom and the non-economic aspects of individual rights might be assumed to
be already established. However, there still remain non-established economic
parts of individual rights, which might be either treated as parameters or as
variables for relevant resource allocation problems. For instance, we may view
self-ownership as such a right guaranteeing individual autonomy. The notion
of self-ownership originates from the argument of the Lockean proviso of John
Locke and was used by Robert Nozick (1974) as the principle to justify private
o w n e r s h i pi nc a p i t a l i s ts o c i e t i e s .N e v e r theless, the notion of self-ownership can
be connected with two versions of entitlement principles, that is, the entitle-
ment principles in the weak sense and in the strong sense, as van Parijs (1995)
discussed.8 Naoki Yoshihara
The entitlement principle in the weaker sense regards self-ownership as
a variable for society. Thus, according to this weaker sense of the principle,
self-ownership can be seen as freedom or respect for the decision-making of
individuals and identiﬁed with political freedom and freedom of choice of occu-
pations, etc.6 In this version, the notion of self-ownership is entirely consistent
with redistribution policies which may induce the reconstruction of a given
rights structure in order to achieve a given distributional goal. This is actually
the position that van Parijs (1995) takes. On the other hand, the entitlement
principle in the stronger sense no longer views self-ownership as a control
variable, but as a parameter which society respects. This stronger sense of
the principle can be identiﬁed with the arguments made by John Locke. This
principle also made a solid basis for the original appropriation of unowned
external resources, which was proposed by Libertarians including Locke and
Nozick.
We also take the same position as van Parijs (1995) regarding the notion
of self-ownership, and identify the contents of individual liberal rights within
the context of resource allocation problems. First, individual liberal rights
guarantee freedom of choice in terms of personal consumption. That is, other
than the individual in question, no one else has the right to decide the way
to dispose of private goods and leisure time available to him/her. W. l.o.g.,
we should assume that the right of freedom of choice in consumption, in the
context of passive freedom, is presumed to be guaranteed in standard economic
models of resource allocation problems.
Secondly, individual liberal rights contain the right to freedom from forced
labor. This right consists of the freedom to choose a profession, the freedom
to enter into an employment contract, etc. However, in simple economic mod-
els like this paper, this right may be reduced to the right to choose labor
hours, because there is no diﬀerence in profession, and all individuals engage
in homogeneous labor.
The right to choose labor hours is deﬁned as follows:
Deﬁnition 1 [Kranich (1994)]: An allocation rule γ =( M,g) ∈ Γ is labor-
sovereign if, for all i ∈ N and all xi ∈ [0,x], there exists mi ∈ Mi such that,
for all m−i ∈ M−i, gi1(mi,m−i)=xi.
Let ΓL denote the subclass of Γ which consists solely of allocation rules sat-
isfying labor sovereignty. Then:
Labor Sovereignty (LS): For any e ∈ E and any (z,γ),(z0,γ0) ∈ R(e), if
γ ∈ ΓL and γ0 ∈ Γ \ ΓL, then ((z,γ),(z0,γ0)) ∈ P(Q(e)).
6 In fact, van Parijs (1995) insists, “Though not strictly equivalent to ‘basic lib-
erties’ or ‘human rights’ as expressed, for example, in Rawls’s ﬁrst principle of
justice or in the constitutions of liberal democracies, self-ownership is closely
associated with most of them.” [van Parijs (1995; p. 235; NOTES Chapter 1, 8.)]On Non-welfarist Social Ordering Functions 9
The axiom LS manifests that the extended social alternative with labor
sovereign rule should be given a higher priority than any alternative with-
out it. This manifestation should be implemented regardless of what resource
allocations the labor sovereign rule or the non-labor sovereign rule realizes as
Nash equilibrium outcomes. This expresses an extremely non-consequential
value.
Note that if a society executes a non-labor sovereign rule, then such a
society might allow the policy-maker to execute some sort of forced labor.
The axiom LS rejects such a society and an economic institution. According
to this axiom, even an egalitarian redistribution policy would not be accepted
unless it were implemented without using forced labor. I believe that the
principle of self-ownership based on the weak sense of entitlement principle,
and also, even Rawls’s ﬁrst principle of justice [Rawls (1971)] should have the
form of LS within this economic model.
(II) Evaluation based on a criterion of Distributive Justice
Our next criterion is meant to capture an aspect of non-welfaristic egal-
itarianism. It hinges on what theories of distributive justice we take, which
requires an instrument that incorporates the various criteria of distributive
justice.
Such an instrument is given by a mapping J : E ³ Zn × Zn which as-
sociates a binary relation J (e) ⊆ Z (s) × Z (s) with each economy e ∈ E.
Denote the class of binary relation mappings by J. Such a binary relation
J (e) represents a criterion based on a certain theory of distributive justice
and alternative feasible allocations are ranked according to this criterion. For
instance, if the mapping J represents Sen’s theory of equality of capability,
then J (e) provides a ranking over alternative capability assignments avail-
able to each economy e ∈ E, and the rational choice set, derived from this
J (e), is regarded as consisting of the most ‘equitable’ capability assignments
under e ∈ E.7 In this case, the ranking made by J should be invariant with
respect to the change in the proﬁle of utility functions: that is, J (e)=J (e0)
holds whenever s = s0 holds. In contrast, if J represents Dworkinian theory
of “equality of resources” [Dworkin, (1981b; 2000)], J might not have such an
invariance property: that is, J (e) 6= J (e0) may hold even if s = s0.M o r e o v e r ,
if J represents the theory of “equality of welfare,” then J (e)=J (e0)s h o u l d
hold for any e,e0 ∈ E with u = u0. In such a way, this mapping can be univer-
sally applicable. Moreover, if J represents the criterion of leximin assignment
of opportunity sets suggested by van Parijs (1995), then J should rationalize
feasible allocations satisfying undominated diversity [van Parijs (1995)].8 In
7 Gotoh, Suzumura, and Yoshihara (2005) argues this case.
8 Given any economy e =( u,s) ∈ E, a feasible allocation z ∈ Z (s) meets undom-
inated diversity if for any i,j ∈ N , there exists at least one individual k ∈ N
such that uk (zi) ≥ uk (zj).10 Naoki Yoshihara
any case, if J represents a criterion of distributive justice, it should satisfy at
least the following requirement:
Minimal Egalitarianism (ME): For each e =( u,s) ∈ E and each z,z0 ∈
Z (s) such that for any i,j ∈ N, si = sj and xi = xj = x0
i = x0
j,i ft h e r e
exist i,j ∈ N such that y0
i >y i ≥ yj >y 0
j and yk = y0
k for any k 6= i,j,t h e n
(z,z0) ∈ P (J (e)).
Denote the class of binary relation mappings satisfying ME by J ME.T h i s
axiom says that, any transfer from a poorer person to a richer person, given
that these two persons provide the same labor hours and other things remain
the same, should be undesirable, which shares the same spirit as the Pigou-
Dalton principle. Note that various types of distributive justice satisfy ME
if each of those theories is formulated as a particular J ∈ J. In fact, Sen’s
theory of equality of capability, Dworkin’s theory of equality of resources, van
Parijs’s undominated diversity, and even the equity as no-envy [Foley (1967)]
respectively, could have their own representations within J ME.
If J ∈ J ME represents a non-welfarist egalitarianism with objective well-
being indices, then J might satisfy the following requirement:
Objective Egalitarianism (OE): For each e =( u,s),e0 =( u0,s0) ∈ E, if
s = s0,t h e nJ (e)=J (e0).
Denote the class of mappings which satisfy ME and OE by J MOE. Note that
any J ∈ J MOE is invariant with respect to change in the proﬁle of individ-
ual utility functions. Thus, for instance, Sen’s theory of equality of capability
has its representation within J MOE, as formulated in Gotoh, Suzumura, and
Yoshihara (2005). In contrast, the representation of van Parijs’s undominated
diversity does not belong to J MOE, since undominated diversity needs infor-
mation about individual utility functions.
Now, our second axiom on ESOFsi sg i v e nb ym e a n so ft h eb i n a r yr e l a t i o n
mapping J ∈ J, as follows:
Respect for J-based fairness (J-RF): For any e ∈ E and any (z,γ),(z0,γ0) ∈
R(e),i f z =( x,y), z0 =( x0,y0) and x = x0, then:
((z,γ),(z0,γ0)) ∈ Q(e) ⇔ (z,z0) ∈ J (e);
((z,γ),(z0,γ0)) ∈ P (Q(e)) ⇔ (z,z0) ∈ P (J (e)).
In evaluating the relative wellness of any two extended alternatives, the ax-
iom J-RF focuses only on the corresponding feasible allocations, and under
a certain constraint, it claims that the evaluation by the ESOF over ex-
tended alternatives should be consistent with the evaluation by J over the
corresponding feasible allocations. Here, the “certain constraint” is given by
“z =( x,y), z0 =( x0,y0)a n dx = x0.”On Non-welfarist Social Ordering Functions 11
It may well be asked why J-RF imposes the premise x = x0. The reasons
are twofold. First, the choice of individual labor hours is a matter to be left
to individual responsibility, and social value judgements should respect indi-
vidual choices accordingly. Second, if the requirement of J-RF is applied to
ESOFsw i t h o u tt h ep r e m i s ex = x0, this instantly causes the incompatibility
with the Paretian axiom, which will be discussed below.
As such, J-RF evaluates the desirability of extended social alternatives
only from the viewpoint of J-fairness on resource allocations. Unlike the axiom
LS, J-RF represents a consequentialist value. This is because this axiom
evaluates the extended alternatives based solely on the evaluation of their
corresponding resource allocations.
(III) Evaluation based on the welfarist value
Finally, let us introduce the axiom of ESOFs based on the welfarist value.
It is deﬁned as an extension of the standard Pareto principle:
Pareto in Allocations (PA): For any e ∈ E and any (z,γ),(z0,γ0) ∈ R(e),
if ui(zi) >u i(z0
i) for all i ∈ N, then ((z,γ),(z0,γ0)) ∈ P(Q(e)), and if
ui(zi)=ui(z0
i) for all i ∈ N, then ((z,γ),(z0,γ0)) ∈ I(Q(e)).
The axiom PA also focuses only on the feasible allocation in evaluating
the relative wellness of any two extended alternatives, and it claims that the
evaluation by the ESOF over extended alternatives should be consistent with
the Pareto superiority relation or the Pareto indiﬀerence relation over feasible
allocations. Thus, by the almost same reason as the case of J-RF, PA also
represents a position of consequentialism.
3 Impossibility of ESOFs satisfying LS, J-RF, and PA
Now, we are ready to discuss the existence of ESOFsw h i c hs i m u l t a n e o u s l y
satisfy the axioms LS, J-RF,a n dPA. According to the technique introduced
in Appendix 1 of this paper, we can see this problem by examining the
properties of binary relation functions, each of which respectively represents
one of the above mentioned axioms.
Let QL : E ³ (Zn × Γ)
2 be a binary relation function such that for any
e ∈ E and any (z,γ),(z0,γ0) ∈ R(e), the following holds:
((z,γ),(z0,γ0)) ∈ P(QL(e))⇔ [γ ∈ ΓL & γ0 / ∈ ΓL];
((z,γ),(z0,γ0)) ∈ I(QL(e))⇔ (z,γ)=( z0,γ0).
Let QJF : E ³ (Zn × Γ)
2 be a binary relation function such that for any
e ∈ E and any (z,γ),(z0,γ0) ∈ R(e)w i t hz =(x,y)a n dz0 =( x0,y0), the










⇔ x = x0 and (z,z0) ∈ P (J (e)).
Let QPA : E ³ (Zn × Γ)
2 be a binary relation function such that for any





⇔ ui (zi) >u i (z0





⇔ ui (zi)=ui (z0
i)( ∀i ∈ N).
Let a binary relation function Q be called the minimal relation function w.r.t.
an axiom a if Q satisﬁes the axiom a, and for any binary relation function Q0
satisfying the axiom a, Q0(e) ⊇ Q(e) holds. Note that each of QL, QJF,a n d
QPA is the minimal relation function w.r.t. each of the axioms LS, J-RF,
and PA.
Thus, if there exists an ESOF Q which satisﬁes these three axioms, Q(e) ⊇
QL(e) ∪ QJF(e) ∪ QPA(e) holds for each e ∈ E.D e ﬁne QLJP by QLJP(e) ≡
QL(e) ∪ QJF(e) ∪ QPA(e)f o re a c he ∈ E. According to Proposition A1 in
Appendix 1,t h e r ee x i s t sa nESOF which satisﬁes the axioms LS, J-RF,
and PA if and only if QLJP(e)i sconsistent for each e ∈ E.9 Unfortunately,
QLJP(e) is not consistent for some e ∈ E. This is due to the following property:
Proposition 1: The union of any two of the relations QL(e), QJF(e),a n d
QPA(e) is inconsistent for some e ∈ E and for any J ∈ J ME.
To begin with, the inconsistency of QL(e) ∪ QJF(e) is easily conﬁrmed
by the fact that QL(e) is interested solely in the wellness of allocation rules,
whereas QJF(e) represents the criterion which judges the wellness of extended
alternatives, completely ignoring the wellness of allocation rules. A similar
argument can be applied to the case of QL(e) ∪ QPA(e).
How about the binary relation QJF (e) ∪ QPA(e) ? This is related to the
issue known as the problem of compatibility between fairness and eﬃciency in
resource allocations, and its answer seems to depend on the criteria of distribu-
tive justice J. However, as the following example shows, if J ∈ J ME,t h e n
QJF (e)a n dQPA(e) are incompatible, regardless of what type of distributive
justice this J represents.10
Example 1:L e tN = {1,2} and x = 3. The production function is given by
f(x)=x for all x ∈ R+.D e ﬁne an economic environment e =( u,s) ∈ E as
follows: Let si =1f o ra n yi ∈ N. Consider the following four feasible alloca-
tions: z∗ =( ( 1 ,1),(1,1)), z∗∗ = ((2,2),(2,2)), z∗ (θ) = ((1,1+θ),(1,1 − θ))
,a n dz∗∗ (θ) = ((2,2 − θ),(2,2+θ)), where θ ∈ (0,1). The utility function of
9 The deﬁnition of consistent binary relations is given by Deﬁnition 4 in Appendix
1b e l o w .
10 A similar incompatibility result is also obtained by Fleurbaey and Trannoy (2003).On Non-welfarist Social Ordering Functions 13
the individual 1 is assumed to have the following property: for z =( x,y) ∈ Z,
if z = z∗
1 (θ)o rz = z∗∗
1 ,t h e n
u1 (z)=( 1− θ + ε) · (x − x)+y,w h e r eε > 0 is small enough;
and if z = z∗∗
1 (θ)o rz = z∗
1,t h e n
u1 (z)=( 1− θ − ε) · (x − x)+y.
Also, the utility function of the individual 2 is assumed to have the following
property: for z =( x,y) ∈ Z with x ∈ [0,1),
u2 (z)=( 1− θ) · (x − x)+y;
for z =( x,y) ∈ Z with x ∈ [1,x], if z = z∗∗
2 (θ)o rz = z∗
2,t h e n
u2 (z)=( 1+θ − ε) · (x − x)+y;
and if z = z∗
2 (θ)o rz = z∗∗
2 ,t h e n
u2 (z)=( 1+θ + ε) · (x − x)+y.
Figure 1 illustrates such a situation.14 Naoki Yoshihara
Let γ∗, γ∗∗, γ∗ (θ), and γ∗∗ (θ) be the allocation rules respectively in which
z∗, z∗∗, z∗ (θ), and z∗∗ (θ) become respectively Nash equilibrium outcomes
under e ∈ E. Then, if J ∈ J ME, its corresponding QJF (e)s h o u l dh a v e :









On the other hand, by the deﬁnition of QPA(e), we have:









Thus, the binary relation QJF (e) ∪ QPA(e) is not consistent. u t
Thus, this incompatibility can be applied for any J representing any mean-
ingful equity criterion, such as the ‘equity as no-envy11’ and Sen’s theory
of “equality of capability.12” This is because any meaningful equity criterion
should meet ME.
Note as the above example shows, the incompatibility between QJF (e)a n d
QPA(e) is obtained by using the weak Pareto principle only and without any
help of the Pareto indiﬀerence condition. The Pareto indiﬀerence condition is
not a crucial factor for this incompatibility.
4 On Possibility of Second-Best Extended Social
Ordering Functions
So far, the previous section showed that there is no ESOF which satisﬁes
the three basic axioms, LS, J-RF, PA, simultaneously. Then, the next step
is to examine the possibility of the second-best ESOFs which satisfy some
weaker requirements of the three basic axioms. There are at least two types
of methods used to solve this problem. The ﬁrst method is based on the
pluralistic application of axioms proposed by Sen and Williams (1982). The
second method is based on the lexicographic application of axioms.T h ef o r m a l
deﬁnitions of these approaches are given in Appendix 2.
Here, we focus on the lexicographic application, which sometimes appeared
in the literature of normative theories such as Rawls (1971) and van Parijs
(1995). The lexicographic application takes one priority order among axioms,
and then makes a ranking between any two alternatives in accordance with
the ﬁrst prior axiom. Then, if the pair of alternatives is non-comparable with
respect to the ﬁrst prior axiom, then the second prior axiom is applied for
ranking them. In the following discussion, we will show that even according to
this lexicographic application, we cannot yet generally construct a consistent
11 The example of the latest successful research is Tadenuma (2002). Also, see Yoshi-
hara (2005).
12 In fact, Gotoh, Suzumura, and Yoshihara (2005) show that if J represents Sen’s
theory of “equality of capability,” then J-RF is incompatible with PA.On Non-welfarist Social Ordering Functions 15
ESOFs. Then, we will consider a further concession to construct the second-
best ESOFs. It is a weaker variant of lexicographic application in the sense
that the second prior axiom is applied only to a subset, not to the whole set,
of non-comparable pairs of the ﬁrst prior axiom. Based on this method, we
will show the existence of four types of the second-best ESOFs.
For any e ∈ E and any binary relation Q(e) ⊆ (Zn × Γ)
2,l e tN (Q(e)) ⊆
(Zn × Γ)
2 be deﬁned by: for any (z,γ),(z0,γ0) ∈ R(e),
((z,γ),(z0,γ0)) ∈ N (Q(e)) ⇔ ((z,γ),(z0,γ0)) / ∈ Q(e)&( ( z0,γ0),(z,γ)) / ∈ Q(e).
Note that this relation is the non-comparable part of Q(e). To see the pos-
sibility of the second-best ESOFs based on the lexicographic application, let
us ﬁrst examine J-RF ﬁrst-PA second priority rule, which is to consider a
binary relation function QJ`P
lex : E ³ (Zn × Γ)
2,d e ﬁned as follows: for any
e ∈ E,
QJ`P






























lex (e) ranks any two extended alternatives by applying the
axiom J-RF in the ﬁrst place, and if this pair belongs to the non-comparable
part of QJF (e), then PA is applied to rank them. In a similar way, we can also
consider PA ﬁrst-J-RF second priority rule, and deﬁne the binary relation
function QP`J
lex : E ³ (Zn × Γ)
2.
Unfortunately, we still obtain the following impossibilities:
Proposition 2: Both QJ`P
lex (e) and QP`J
lex (e) are inconsistent for some e ∈ E,
if J ∈ J ME.
This is checked by using the same four feasible allocations and the same
economic environment as in Example 1.I nf a c t ,w ec a ns e ei nExample 1
that









which implies that the discussion of inconsistency in Example 1 can be
applied to QP`J
lex (e). The same discussion is applied to the binary relation
QJ`P
lex (e).
As Proposition 2 indicates, we cannot construct any second-best ESWF
based on the lexicographic application. To secure the existence of a compati-
ble lexicographic combination of our basic axioms, a further concession seems
to be required. As such one, let us consider, for each e ∈ E, to choose appro-
priately a subset N∗ ¡
QJF (e)
¢













Given J ∈ J and x ∈ [0,x]
n,l e t16 Naoki Yoshihara
B (J (e);x) ≡ {(x,y) ∈ Z (s) | ∀(x,y0) ∈ Z (s):( ( x,y0),(x,y)) / ∈ P (J (e))}.








be given as follows:
((z,γ),(z0,γ0)) ∈ N∗ ¡
QJF (e)
¢
⇔ x 6= x0 & z ∈ B (J (e);x)&z0 ∈ B (J (e);x0).
That is, ((z,γ),(z0,γ0)) is a non-comparable pair in the sense of N∗ ¡
QJF (e)
¢
if and only if z and z0 of this pair have mutually diﬀerent labor supplies,
x 6= x0, and each of them is a J (e)-maximal allocation within the same proﬁle
of labor supplies. Note that the condition x 6= x0 implies that N∗ ¡
QJF (e)
¢




. Then, for any e ∈ E,l e t :
Q∗J`P




























lex (e) ranks any two extended alternatives by applying the
axiom J-RF in the ﬁrst place, and if this pair belongs to the speciﬁc non-
comparable part, N∗ ¡
QJF (e)
¢
,t h e nPA is applied to rank them.














consistent. For any e ∈ E,l e t
∂S (e) ≡ {u ∈ Rn | ∃z ∈ P (e):ui (zi)=ui (∀i ∈ N)}. Then, for each u ∈






= ui.N o w ,l e tPs (e) ≡
©
zuª
u∈∂S(e).B yd e ﬁnition, Ps (e) ⊆
P (e). Note that for any zu,z
u
0









((z,γ),(z0,γ0)) ∈ N∗ ¡
QPA(e)
¢
⇔ z,z0 ∈ P s (e)a n dz 6= z0.
That is, ((z,γ),(z0,γ0)) is a non-comparable pair in the sense of N∗ ¡
QPA(e)
¢
if and only if z and z0 of this pair are diﬀerent Pareto eﬃcient allocations,
and moreover, their corresponding utility allocations are also diﬀerent. Note
that the latter property follows from z,z0 ∈ P s (e). By this property, z and
z0 are Pareto non-comparable, so that N∗ ¡
QPA(e)
¢





. Then, for any e ∈ E,l e t :
Q∗P`J




























lex (e) ranks over any two extended alternatives by applying
the axiom PA in the ﬁrst place, and if this pair belongs to the speciﬁc non-
comparable part, N∗ ¡
QPA(e)
¢
,t h e nJ-RF is applied to rank them.
Using these concessive lexicographic binary relation functions, we obtain:On Non-welfarist Social Ordering Functions 17
Theorem 1: Let J ∈ J ME, and for each e ∈ E, J (e) be a continuous quasi-
ordering on Z (s)13 such that for each x ∈ [0,x]
n, B (J (e);x) is a singleton.
Then, there exist at least four ESOFs such that each of which contains either
of the following binary relation functions as subrelation mappings:
(i) Q
L`(∗P`J)
lex ;( i i )Q
(∗P`J)`L
lex ; (iii) Q
L`(∗J`P)
lex ;a n d( i v )Q
(∗J`P)`L
lex .
Let QL`(∗P`J) (resp. QL`(∗J`P))b ea nESOF w h i c hi so b t a i n e da sa no r -




lex ). Note that both QL`(∗P`J)
and QL`(∗J`P) are interesting from the viewpoint of non-welfaristic normative
theories. Both of them are given by the weaker sense of lexicographic appli-
cation as discussed above, and give the ﬁrst priority to a non-consequential
axiom LS rather than the other two consequentialist axioms. Both the Rawl-
sian two principles of justice combined with the Pareto principle and the Real
Libertarianism [van Parijs (1995)] combined with the Pareto principle would
be formalized as the QL`(∗P`J)-type or the QL`(∗J`P)-type.
4.1 Rationally Chosen Allocation Rules via ESOFs
In this subsection, we characterize allocation rules rationally chosen via
QL`(∗P`J) and/or QL`(∗J`P). Given any Q ∈ Q, the rational choice set C (Q)
of allocation rules associated with Q is deﬁned by:
γ ∈ C (Q) ⇔∀ e ∈ E, ∃z ∈ τ(γ,e)s . t .∀(z0,γ0) ∈ R(e), ((z,γ),(z0,γ0)) ∈ Q(e).
What kinds of allocation rules can be rationally chosen via ESOFs






,t h e n
what kinds of feasible allocations can this γ implement in Nash equilib-







be called the ﬁrst best allocation rule if for
any e ∈ E and any z ∈ τ(γ,e), z is Pareto eﬃcient and z ∈ B (J (e);x).
Our particular interest is the existence issue of the ﬁrst best allocation rule
rationalized by QL`(∗P`J) and/or QL`(∗J`P).
Let us call γ =( M,g) ∈ Γ an eﬃcient allocation rule if, for any e ∈ E,
z ∈ τ(γ,e) implies z ∈ P(e). Denote the subclass of Γ which consists solely of
eﬃcient allocation rules by ΓPE. Let us call γ =( M,g) ∈ Γ a J-fair allocation
rule if, for any e ∈ E, z ∈ τ(γ,e) implies z ∈ B (J (e);x). Denote the subclass
of Γ which consists solely of J-fair allocation rules by ΓJF. Then:
Theorem 2: Let J ∈ J MOE, and for each e ∈ E, J (e) be a continuous
ordering on Z (s) such that for each x ∈ [0,x]
n, B (J (e);x) is a singleton.
Then, there exists an ESOF QL`(∗J`P) (resp. QL`(∗P`J)) such that for each
e ∈ E, QL`(∗J`P) (e) ⊇ Q
L`(∗J`P)
lex (e) (resp. QL`(∗P`J) (e) ⊇ Q
L`(∗P`J)
lex (e)),
13 Aq u a s i - o r d e r i n gR is continuous on X if for any x ∈ X,i t su p p e ra n dl o w e r
contour sets at R is open.18 Naoki Yoshihara
and ∅ 6= C
¡
QL`(∗J`P)¢




ΓL ∩ ΓPE∩ ΓJF).
Theorem 2 shows that if J ∈ J MOE, then the rationally chosen allocation
rule via QL`(∗J`P) has the following desired properties: it is labor sovereign,
and implements Pareto eﬃcient and J-fair allocations in Nash equilibria. The
same property holds for the case of QL`(∗P`J).
This characterization in Theorem 2 is due to the objective egalitarianism
of J.I fJ ∈ J MOE,t h e nB (J (e);x)=B (J (e0);x) for any x ∈ [0,x]
n and
any e,e0 ∈ E with s = s0. This invariance property of B (J (·);x)p l a y sa n
important role in the existence issue of the ﬁrst best allocation rules ratio-
nalized by QL`(∗J`P) and/or QL`(∗P`J). In contrast, if J ∈ J ME\J MOE,
then the existence of the ﬁrst best allocation rules rationalized by QL`(∗J`P)
and/or QL`(∗P`J) is not necessarily guaranteed. For instance, let JUD ∈
J ME\J MOE represent undominated diversity. Then, there is no ﬁrst best
allocation rule in terms of Pareto eﬃciency and JUD-fairness, so that the
corresponding rationally chosen allocation rule does not have such desired
properties.14
5 Discussion
In this section, we provide some remarks on the relevant literature of ESOFs.
As mentioned in the introduction, Kaplow and Shavell (2001) and Blackorby,
Bossert, and Donaldson (2005) also discuss diﬀerent types of ‘extended’ social
ordering functions.
For instance, Kaplow and Shavell (2001) deﬁne any “non-welfarist” axiom
as being incompatible with the Pareto Indiﬀerence principle. Then, they show
that if a social welfare function satisﬁes continuity and such a “non-welfarist”
axiom, then it violates the weak Pareto principle. This is derived from the fact
that the continuity of the social welfare function and the weak Pareto principle
immediately imply the Pareto Indiﬀerence principle.15 Blackorby et al. (2005)
show that if a social welfare function deﬁned over the domain of multi-proﬁles
satisﬁes Universal Domain, Pareto Indiﬀerence, and Binary Independence of
Irrelevant Alternatives, then it implies Strong Neutrality. Note that Strong
Neutrality is regarded as the axiom of Welfarism.
It is well known that, even in the case of B-S social welfare functions
with the domains of the utility proﬁles only, Sen (1977) and Roberts (1980)
show that the conventional Arrovian axioms of universal domain, Pareto in-
diﬀerence, and binary independence of irrelevant alternatives together imply
strong neutrality. The crucial diﬀerence of Blackorby et al. (2005) from Sen
14 This point is discussed in Yoshihara (2006).
15 Kaplow and Shavell (2001) consider the Pareto indiﬀerence principle as the deﬁ-
nition of welfarism for social welfare functions.On Non-welfarist Social Ordering Functions 19
(1977) and Roberts (1980) is that the former deﬁnes Binary Independence of
Irrelevant Alternatives as requiring the social ranking of any two alternatives
to depend on not only the utility information but also the non-welfaristic
information associated with those two alternatives only. Hence, the indepen-
dence axiom of Blackorby et al. (2005) is non-welfarist in nature, and it is
weaker than the Sen-Roberts independence axiom. Nevertheless, Blackorby et
al. (2005) conclude that even in such a framework, the possible social ordering
function is only welfarist in nature, if it is required to satisfy the other Ar-
rovian axioms such as Universal Domain and Pareto Indiﬀerence. This seems
to provides us with a strong justiﬁcation of welfarism.
We review the relationship between our approach and the above mentioned
works brieﬂy. First, the welfarist theorem of Blackorby et al. (2005) relies
strongly on the axiom of Universal Domain. Such a domain condition cannot
directly be applied to the resource allocation problems this paper considers
here. For instance, in this paper, all available utility functions are restricted so
as to be strongly monotonic and quasi-concave. In fact, as shown in Yoshihara
(2006a), if a reasonable domain restriction is imposed, then an ESOF of
QL`(∗P`J)-type exists and it satisﬁes the independence axiom of Blackorby
et al. (2005). The domain of this ESOF is restricted, because 1) the domain
of welfarist information Un is restricted to the class of proﬁles of continuous,
strictly monotonic, and quasi-concave utility functions, and 2) the domain of
non-welfarist information is also restricted.
Thus, our result on the possibility of the non-welfarist ESOFsi sc o m p a t -
ible with the result of Blackorby et al. (2005). Moreover, I believe that the
universal domain assumption of the non-welfaristic information is not sound
from an ethical point of view. This is because a well-being indicator express-
ing non-welfaristic information should be deﬁned as a binary relation function
characterized by a system of axioms,16 so it needs diﬀerent formal treatment
from the welfarist indicator (individual utility functions) representing capri-
cious subjective preferences.
Secondly, the conclusion of Kaplow and Shavell (2001) gives us basically
the same message as that of Example 1 in this paper. However, Exam-
ple 1 does not suppose the continuity of social ordering, contrary to the
assumption of Kaplow and Shavell (2001). It is also worth noting that this
resulting impossibility does not imply a justiﬁcation of welfarism at all. This
is because, as Fleurbaey, Tungodden, and Chang (2003) point out, the Pareto
indiﬀerence principle and the welfarist axiom are not equivalent. In fact, our
ESOF Q(∗P`J)`L in Theorem 1 satisﬁes the weak Pareto principle as well
as the Pareto indiﬀerence principle, and it also has the properties of the two
types of non-welfarism (J-RF and LS). However, this type of function does
not meet the continuity axiom. This implies that the real factor inducing the
16 An example of this is a series of works by Pattanaik and Xu (1990), where the
ranking over opportunity sets is characterized by the system of axioms which
reﬂect the viewpoint of “freedom of choice.”20 Naoki Yoshihara
impossibility is not the trade-oﬀ between welfarism and non-welfarism, but
rather the requirement of continuity.
To summarize this, despite the conclusions of Kaplow and Shavell (2001)
and Blackorby et al. (2005), it is eminently possible to construct a desirable so-
cial ordering function that has the properties of the welfarist Pareto principle
and the non-welfarist criteria.
6C o n c l u s i o n
I nt h ep r e v i o u ss e c t i o n s ,w ed iscussed that the welfarist’s framework developed
in traditional welfare economics provided us with a rather limited perspective
for social evaluation, so a more comprehensive framework would be neces-
sary. As such, we proposed the extended framework within which not only
welfarist consequential values, but also non-welfarist consequential values and
non-consequential values can be taken into consideration. Moreover, we in-
troduced extended social ordering functions and, as axioms of which, Labor
Sovereignty, Respect for J-based Fairness based on non-welfaristic well-being
notions, and the Pareto principle. Then, we showed a method of applying
these axioms based on a weaker lexicographic approach, by which some con-
sistent extended social ordering functions can be constructed in order to be
compatible with the above three values.
7A p p e n d i x1
In this Appendix 1, the elementary properties of binary relations are provided,
which constitute an analytical technique useful to consider the existence issue
of ESOFs. Let X be the universal set of any alternatives and R be a binary
relation deﬁned over this set. If R satisﬁes completeness and transitivity in
particular, we shall call it an ordering.A l s o :
Deﬁnition 2: An axiom a is represented by a binary relation Ra ⊆ X × X
if the following condition holds: for any x,x0 ∈ X,
(x,x0) ∈ Ra ⇔ a c c o r d i n gt ot h ea x i o ma, x is at least desired as x0;
(x,x0) ∈ P (Ra) ⇔ according to the axiom a, x is strictly desirable than x0.
In general, the binary relation representing an axiom is not necessarily a
complete ordering. In the following discussion, let us denote the representation
of the axiom a by Ra. Then, let us see how an ordering R ⊆ X × X satisﬁes
an axiom in general.
















As Deﬁnition 3 suggests, a binary relation R satisﬁes axioms a1, ..., am if






Given a class of axioms on ordering relations, one interesting problem is
to examine whether there exists an ordering relation that satisﬁes all of these
axioms. To discuss this question, the following notion is crucial:
Deﬁnition 4 [Suzumura (1976)]: A binary relation R ⊆ X × X is con-
sistent if , for any ﬁnite subset
©
x1,x 2,...,xtª












Proposition A1: T h e r ee x i s t sa no r d e r i n gr e l a t i o nR ⊆ X×X which satisﬁes
a class of axioms
©
aλª





According to Proposition A1,i ti ss u ﬃcient to conﬁrm whether or not the






This condition can be useful when we discuss the existence of ESOFs satis-
fying some classes of axioms.
8A p p e n d i x2
1. The pluralistic application of axioms [Sen and Williams (1982)]
Given any two axioms a and b which are mutually incompatible, the plu-
ralistic application of axioms is to construct a binary relation Ra∩b ⊆ X ×X










. Then, Ra∩b becomes consistent whenever Ra and Rb are re-
spectively consistent. Thus, this kind of second best resolution is to consider
an ordering extension of Ra∩b.
2. The lexicographic application of axioms
Given any binary relation R,l e tN (R) ⊆ X ×X be deﬁned as follows: for
any x,x0∈X,( x,x0) ∈ N (R) ⇔ (x,x0) / ∈ R and (x0,x) / ∈ R.17 Given any two
axioms a and b which are mutually incompatible, the lexicographic application
of axioms is to construct a binary relation Ra`b
lex ⊆ X × X which is deﬁned
by: for any x,x0 ∈ X,
(x,x0) ∈ Ra`b
lex ⇔ (x,x0) ∈ Ra ∪
£







⇔ (x,x0) ∈ P (Ra) ∪
£




17 The deﬁnition of this binary relation is based on Suzumura (2004).22 Naoki Yoshihara
That is, suppose that the society gives a priority to axiom a rather than to
axiom b. Then, for any two alternatives, a is applied by Ra`b
lex in the ﬁrst
place to make a comparison between them, and b is applied only if these two
alternatives are incomparable by a. This is called axiom a ﬁrst-axiom b second
priority rule.
According to Proposition A1, an ordering extension of Ra`b
lex is possi-
ble whenever Ra`b
lex is consistent. Unfortunately, however, the consistency of
Ra`b
lex is not guaranteed in general. Thus, we need an algorithm to see what
properties of the axioms a and/or b can make Ra`b
lex consistent.
Suppose that Ra`b
lex is not consistent. Our strategy is to choose an appro-
priate subset N∗ (Ra)f r o mN (Ra)s u c ht h a t
R∗a`b
lex ≡ Ra ∪
£
N∗ (Ra) ∩ Rb¤
becomes consistent. Then, the problem is to identify what conditions this
N∗ (Ra) should satisfy so as to make R∗a`b
lex consistent. A general solution to
this problem is given by Yoshihara (2005), and here we introduce a corollary
of this solution given in Yoshihara (2005).
Deﬁnition 5 [Yoshihara (2005)]: Given a binary relation R ⊆ X×X, a subset








N∗ (R) holds for any k =1 ,...,t− 1.
Proposition A2 [Yoshihara (2005)]: Let Ra be a quasi-ordering over X.
Then, if the relation N∗ (Ra) ⊆ N (Ra) is transitive and connected, then the
relation R∗a`b
lex ⊆ X × X is consistent for any quasi-ordering Rb ⊆ X × X.
9 Appendix 3: Proofs of Theorems 1 and 2






are connected and transitive,w h e r et h ed e ﬁnition of con-
nectedness is given in Deﬁnition 5 of Appendix 2. Hence, by Proposition
A2 of Appendix 2, both Q∗J`P
lex and Q∗P`J
lex are consistent binary relation
functions. u t
Lemma 1: For each e ∈ E, ∪
x∈[0,x]n B (J (e);x) has a closed graph in Z (s).
Proof. It can be shown in a similar way to Lemma 4 in Gotoh, Suzumura,
and Yoshihara (2005). u t
Lemma 2 [Yoshihara (2000)]: For each s ∈ Sn,l e th :[ 0 ,x]n → Rn
+





yi. Then, for any e =( u,s) ∈ E,t h e r ee x i s t sx∗ ∈ [0,x]n
such that (x∗,h(x∗)) is a Pareto eﬃcient allocation for e.On Non-welfarist Social Ordering Functions 23
Proof. See Proposition 3 in Gotoh, Suzumura, and Yoshihara (2005). u t
Lemma 3: For each e =( u,s) ∈ E, there exists a Pareto eﬃcient allocation
z∗ ∈ Z (s) such that z∗ ∈∪
x∈[0,x]n B (J (e);x).
Proof. See Lemma 5 in Gotoh, Suzumura, and Yoshihara (2005). u t




x∈[0,x]n B (J (e);x)
¸
. Let h :[ 0 ,x]n → Rn
+ be a continuous





Then, there exists a game form γ ∈ ΓL such that, for any e ∈ E, z ∈ τ(γ,e)
holds if and only if z =( x,h(x)), and it is Pareto eﬃcient.
Proof. See Proposition 4 in Gotoh, Suzumura, and Yoshihara (2005). u t
Lemma 5: There exists γ∗ ∈ ΓL such that τ(γ∗,e)=PBJ(e) for all e ∈ E.
Proof. See the proof of Theorem 1 in Gotoh, Suzumura, and Yoshihara
(2005).18 u t
P r o o fo fT h e o r e m2 :Given e ∈ E,l e tS(e) be the utility possibility set of
feasible allocations, and ∂S(e) be its boundary. Since every utility function is
strictly increasing, ∂S(e)i st h es e to fP a r e t oe ﬃcient utility allocations.
(1) C o n s i d e rt h ec a s eo fQL`(∗J`P).D e ﬁne an ordering V (e)o v e rS(e)a s
follows:
1) if u,u0 ∈ ∂S(e), then (u,u0) ∈ I (V (e)),
2) for any u,u0 ∈ S(e), there exist μ,μ0 ∈ [1,+∞) such that μ·u,μ0·u0 ∈ ∂S(e)
and (u,u0) ∈ V (e)i fa n do n l yi fμ ≤ μ0.T h i so r d e r i n gV (e) is continuous
over S(e).
Deﬁne a complete ordering Re,J over ∪
x∈[0,x]n B (J (e);x) as follows: for
any z,z0 ∈∪
x∈[0,x]n B (J (e);x), (z,z0) ∈ Re,J ⇔ (u(z),u(z0)) ∈ V (u). This
ordering Re,J is continuous on ∪
x∈[0,x]n B (J (e);x), and its maximal elements
constitute PBJ (e). Given J ∈ J MOE,l e tJ (e;x) be the restriction of J (e)
into the set of feasible allocations with x.





over Z(s). It is easy
to see that this binary relation is consistent, so that there exists an ordering
extension R∗





by Suzumura’s (1976) extension
t h e o r e m .B a s e du p o nt h i sR∗
e,J, let us consider an ordering function QL`(∗P`J)
as follows: for each e ∈ E and any (z,γ),(z0,γ0) ∈ R(e),
1) if γ ∈ ΓL and γ0 ∈ Γ \ ΓL,t h e n( ( z,γ),(z0,γ0)) ∈ P(QL`(∗J`P)(e));
18 Also, see Yamada and Yoshihara (2005).24 Naoki Yoshihara
2) if either γ,γ0 ∈ ΓL or γ,γ0 ∈ Γ \ ΓL,t h e n
((z,γ),(z0,γ0)) ∈ QL`(∗J`P)(e) ⇔ (z,z0) ∈ R∗
e,J,
((z,γ),(z0,γ0)) ∈ P(QL`(∗J`P)(e)) ⇔ (z,z0) ∈ P(R∗
e,J).
Note that QL`(∗J`P)(e) is complete and transitive, and QL`(∗J`P)(e) ⊇
Q
L`(∗J`P)




= ΓL ∩ ΓPE ∩ ΓJF 3 γ∗.
(2) C o n s i d e rt h ec a s eo fQL`(∗P`J).F o re a c hu ∈ ∂S (e), let us select only one





= ui,a n di ff o rt h i su ∈
∂S (e), there exists z ∈ PBJ (e) such that for each i ∈ N, ui (zi)=ui,t h e n
choose such an allocation as zu.N o w ,l e tP s (e) ≡
©
zuª
u∈∂S(e).B yd e ﬁnition,
P s (e) ⊆ P (e)a n dPs (e) ∩ PBJ (e) 6= ∅. Note that for any zu,z
u
0
∈ P s (e),
u 6= u0.
Deﬁne an ordering R0
e,J over Z(s) as follows: for any z,z0 ∈ Z(s),





if z,z0 ∈ P s (e) ∩ PBJ (e);





if z ∈ P s (e) ∩ PBJ (e)a n dz0 ∈ P s (e)\PBJ (e);
(iii) (z,z0) ∈ R0
e,J ⇔ (z,z0) ∈ J (e)f o rz,z0 ∈ Ps (e)\PBJ (e);





if there exist μ,μ0 ∈ [1,+∞) such that μ · u(z),μ0 ·
u(z0) ∈ ∂S(u)a n dμ < μ0;a n d
(v) (z,z0) ∈ R0
e,J if there exist μ,μ0 ∈ [1,+∞)s u c ht h a tμ· u(z),μ0 ·u(z0) ∈

























Based upon this R0
e,J, let us consider an ordering function QL`(∗P`J) as
follows: for each e ∈ E and any (z,γ),(z0,γ0) ∈ R(e),
1) if γ ∈ ΓL and γ0 ∈ Γ \ ΓL,t h e n( ( z,γ),(z0,γ0)) ∈ P(QL`(∗P`J)(e));
2) if either γ,γ0 ∈ ΓL or γ,γ0 ∈ Γ \ ΓL,t h e n
((z,γ),(z0,γ0)) ∈ QL`(∗P`J)(e) ⇔ (z,z0) ∈ R0
e,J,
((z,γ),(z0,γ0)) ∈ P(QL`(∗P`J)(e)) ⇔ (z,z0) ∈ P(R0
e,J).
Note that QL`(∗P`J)(e) is complete and transitive, and QL`(∗P`J)(e) ⊇
Q
L`(∗P`J)




⊇ ΓL ∩ ΓPE ∩ ΓJF 3 γ∗. u t
10 References
Arrow, K. J. (1963): Social Choice and Individual Values,2 n de d . ,N e wY o r k :
Wiley.On Non-welfarist Social Ordering Functions 25
Blackorby, C., Bossert, W., and D. Donaldson (2005): “Multi-proﬁle Wel-
farism: A Generalization,” Social Choice and Welfare 24, pp. 253-267.
Dworkin, R. (1981a): “What is Equality? Part 1: Equality of Welfare,” Phi-
losophy & Public Aﬀairs 10, pp. 185-246.
Dworkin, R. (1981b): “What is Equality? Part 2: Equality of Resources,”
Philosophy & Public Aﬀairs 10, pp. 283-345.
Dworkin, R. (2000): Sovereign Virtue, Harvard University Press: Cambridge.
Fleurbaey, M. and A. Trannoy (2003): “The Impossibility of a Paretian Egal-
itarian,” Social Choice and Welfare 21, pp. 243-263.
Fleurbaey, M., Tungodden, B., and H. F. Chang (2003): “Any Non-welfarist
Method of Policy Assessment Violates the Pareto Principle: A Comment,”
Journal of Political Economy 111, pp. 1382-1385.
Foley, D. (1967): “Resource Allocation and the Public Sector,” Yale Economic
Essays 7, pp. 45-98.
Gotoh, R., Suzumura, K., and N. Yoshihara (2005): “Extended Social Order-
ing Functions for Rationalizing Fair Game Forms in the sense of Rawls and
Sen,” International Journal of Economic Theory 1, pp. 21-41.
Kaplow, L. and Shavell, S. (2001): “Any Non-welfarist Method of Policy As-
sessment Violates the Pareto Principle,” Journal of Political Economy 109,
pp. 281-286.
Kranich, L. (1994): “Equal Division, Eﬃciency, and the Sovereign Supply of
Labor,” American Economic Review 84, 178-189.
Mill, J. S. (1859): On Liberty, reprinted in M. Warnock (ed), Utilitarianism,
London: Fontana, 1973.
Nozick, R. (1974): Anarchy, State and Utopia,O x f o r d :B a s i lB l a c k w e l l .
Pattanaik, P. K. and K. Suzumura (1996):“Individual Rights and Social Eval-
uation: A Conceptual Framework,” Oxford Economic Papers 48, 194-212.
Pattanaik, P. K. and Xu, Y. (1990): “On Ranking Opportunity Sets in terms
of Freedom of Choice,” Recherches Economiques de Louvain 56, pp. 383-390.
Rawls, J. (1971): AT h e o r yo fJ u s t i c e , Harvard Univ Press, Cambridge.
Roberts, K. (1980): “Interpersonal Comparability and Social Choice Theory,”
Review of Economic Studies 47, pp. 421-439.
Sen, A. K. (1970a): Collective Choice and Social Welfare, San Francisco:
Holden-Day. Republished, Amsterdam: North-Holland, 1979.
Sen, A. K. (1970b): “The Impossibility of a Paretian Liberal,” Journal of
Political Economy 78, pp. 152-157.26 Naoki Yoshihara
Sen, A. K. (1977): “On Weights and Measures: Informational Constraints in
Social Welfare Analysis,” Econometrica 45, pp. 1539-1572.
Sen, A. K. (1979): “Utilitarianism and Welfarism,” Journal of Philosophy 76,
pp. 463-489.
Sen, A. K. (1980): “Equality of What ?” in S. McMurrin (ed.), Tanner Lectures
on Human Values. 1, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge.
Sen, A. K. (1985): Commodities and Capabilities, North-Holland: Amsterdam.
Sen, A. K. and Williams, B. (1982): “Introduction: Utilitarianism and beyond,”
Sen, A. K., and Williams, B., eds, Utilitarianism and beyond, Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press.
Suzumura, K. (1976): “Remarks on the Theory of Collective Choice,” Eco-
nomica 43, pp. 381-90.
Suzumura, K. (2004): “An Extension of Arrow’s Lemma with Economic Ap-
plications,” mimeo.
Tadenuma, K. (2002): “Eﬃciency First or Equity First? Two Principles and
Rationality of Social Choice,” Journal of Economic Theory 104, pp. 462-72.
Van Parijs, P. (1992): “Competing Justiﬁcation of Basic Income,” in van Par-
ijs, P. (ed.) Arguing for Basic Income, Verso, London, pp. 1-43.
Van Parijs, P. (1993): Marxism Recycled, Cambridge University Press, Cam-
bridge.
Van Parijs, P. (1995): Real Freedom for All: What (if Anything) can Justify
Capitalism, Oxford University Press, Oxford.
Yamada, A. and Yoshihara, N. (2005): “Triple Implementation in Production
Economies with unequal skills by Sharing Mechanisms,” Institute of Economic
Research Discussion Paper Series A, No. 475, Hitotsubashi University, forth-
coming in International Journal of Game Theory.
Yoshihara, N. (2000): “On Eﬃcient and Procedurally-Fair Equilibrium Alloca-
tions in Sharing Games,” IER Discussion Paper No. 397, Institute of Economic
Research, Hitotsubashi University.
Yoshihara, N. (2005): “A Resolution of Conﬂicting Claims in Constructing
Social Ordering Functions,” mimeo.
Yoshihara, N. (2006): “Normative Economic Foundation for the Theory of
Welfare State Policies,” presented at Workshop on “Real Freedom for All”
with Van Parijs, Ritsumeikan University, Kyoto, July 7th, 2006.
Yoshihara, N. (2006a): “On Non-welfarist Social Ordering Functions,” mimeo.